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Abstract: 
Young children have been described as critical consumers of information, particularly in the 
domain of language learning. Indeed, children are more likely to learn novel words from people 
with accurate histories of object labeling than with inaccurate ones. But what happens when 
informant testimony conflicts with a tendency to see the world in a particular way? In impression 
formation, children exhibit a positivity bias in personality judgments. This study examined 
whether 3- to 7-year-olds would accept reliable testimony about a stranger’s personality that 
conflicted with a putative positivity bias (i.e., a negative trait attribution). Overall, participants 
accepted testimony from reliable informants more often than expected by chance, although they 
were significantly more likely to do so when the information was positive than when it was 
negative. These findings indicate that in addition to the reliability status of informants, 
information processing biases have a substantial impact on children’s use of informant testimony 
to learn about the social world 
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Article: 
Introduction 
Consider how often you rely on a trustworthy person to acquire information about the strangers 
that you will encounter in the future—the blind date that you will meet this evening, the potential 
employer who will interview you, or the people with whom you will be seated at a wedding 
reception. The ability to draw on others’ knowledge in situations where we are ignorant about 
something is a topic of tremendous interest in the developmental literature, particularly during 
early to middle childhood (e.g., Birch et al., 2008, Jaswal and Neely, 2006 and Koenig et al., 
2004). Children obtain much of their world knowledge by relying on others, and learning to do 
so discriminately is an essential skill for understanding the world around them (Harris, 2007). 
At an early age, children are critical consumers of information from outside sources, particularly 
in language learning (see Harris, 2007). Even toddlers reject incorrect labels for objects (Pea, 
1982). Preschoolers are more likely to accept novel word labels from confident than from 
uncertain informants (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001) and from informants with a prior history of 
labeling known objects accurately than from informants with a history of inaccuracy (e.g., Birch 
et al., 2008, Corriveau and Harris, 2009, Jaswal and Neely, 2006, Koenig and Harris, 2005, 
Koenig et al., 2004, Nurmsoo and Robinson, 2009a and Nurmsoo and Robinson, 2009b). In a 
study by Jaswal and Neely (2006), 3- and 4-year-olds watched as an adult informant and a child 
informant each labeled four familiar objects (e.g., shoe) correctly or incorrectly. In a test phase, 
the same informants provided labels for unfamiliar objects (e.g., paint roller), after which 
children were asked to name the objects. Children were more likely to accept novel words from a 
reliable speaker irrespective of informant age (although they were more likely to rely on the 
adult when both informants were correct (e.g., shoe and sneaker). With age, children’s tendency 
to rely on knowledgeable informants improves in subtle ways. For example, Pasquini, Corriveau, 
Koenig, and Harris (2007) reported that 3-year-olds trusted only informants with a perfect 
history of reliability (100%), whereas 4-year-olds took into account the relative frequency of 
errors when choosing an informant on whom to rely (e.g., they distinguished between one who 
was correct 75% of the time and one who was correct only 25% of the time). Taken together, this 
research indicates that children distinguish between unreliable and reliable speakers and are more 
likely to accept novel information from the latter. 
 
Notably, children do not always discount testimony from previously inaccurate informants when 
learning new information. Instead, they consider reasons why informants were inaccurate in 
deciding whether to accept testimony (Nurmsoo and Robinson, 2009a and Robinson and 
Nurmsoo, 2009; but see Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2009b). In one study, 3- to 5-year-olds attempted 
to learn about the contents of boxes from a puppet with a history of inaccuracy due to a false 
belief (based on the misleading appearance of the box) or for an inexplicable reason (Robinson 
& Nurmsoo, 2009). Children were more likely to endorse testimony from the puppet under 
conditions of false belief, and willingness to trust the puppet was associated with the ability to 
give a false belief explanation of the reason for the puppet’s failure. Thus, children do not simply 
discount unreliable speakers as a rule. Instead, emerging mental state reasoning abilities play an 
important role in their decisions about who to trust. 
 
The aim of this study was to extend inquiry on children’s use of informant testimony to the 
social domain, specifically personality attribution. The majority of previous research has focused 
on language learning and object search, and it is unknown whether children will apply the same 
standards for endorsing informant testimony in the context of social judgments. Of particular 
interest was the degree to which participants would rely on a speaker’s previous history of 
accurate or inaccurate identification of personality labels to make a basic positive or negative 
personality judgment about a stranger. Children engage in basic personality reasoning at an early 
age; even 3-year-olds make global personality attributions of niceness and meanness based on 
behavioral evidence (e.g., Boseovski & Lee, 2006). Both 3- and 4-year-olds use trait information 
to make inductive inferences about preferences (e.g., Heyman & Gelman, 2000) and emotional 
states (e.g., Heyman & Gelman, 1999). During middle to late childhood, children become 
skeptical about statements that are consistent with speakers’ self-interest (Mills & Keil, 2005), 
and they reject self-reports of positive traits, such as intelligence, with age (Heyman & Legare, 
2005). Based on children’s sophistication in using testimony from reliable informants in the 
domain of language learning, as well as increased skepticism in personality judgments with age, 
we might expect that they would extend this skill to the domain of impression formation. 
 
An alternative hypothesis is that biases in personality judgment will affect children’s reliance on 
informant testimony in a specific way. During early to middle childhood, children exhibit a 
positivity bias in reasoning about other people (e.g., Benenson and Dweck, 1986, Boseovski, 
2010, Boseovski and Lee, 2006, Boseovski and Lee, 2008, Boseovski et al., 2009, Heyman et al., 
2003, Lockhart et al., 2002, Lockhart et al., 2008, Rholes and Ruble, 1984 and Stipek and 
Daniels, 1990). For example, preschoolers extend positive attributes of people to irrelevant 
domains (e.g., an intelligent child is also deemed as athletic) (Stipek & Daniels, 1990), disregard 
negative information about other people in personality judgments (Boseovski & Lee, 2008), and 
generate explanations for academic success earlier than for academic failure (e.g., Benenson & 
Dweck, 1986). In general, early to middle childhood is marked by an optimistic sense of self and 
others that may be adaptive in promoting positive social relations and trial-and-error learning 
(see Bjorklund, 1997). Thus, children’s default expectation that “people are nice” may render 
them less willing to accept negative testimony than positive testimony about a stranger even 
when an informant has proven to be reliable in previous trait descriptions and even when 
children have no other knowledge base about the stranger from which to draw. Notably, these 
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; children may be sensitive to reliable testimony yet accept 
positive testimony more readily than negative testimony. 
 
In addition to examining children’s willingness to accept positive and negative testimony about a 
stranger, this study investigated whether age of informant, specifically a maternal figure as 
compared with a peer, would affect children’s endorsement of testimony. Because children 
typically observe behavior directly and make their own judgments about others in the personality 
understanding literature, the degree to which they are swayed by parent impressions as compared 
with peer impressions is unknown. Based on Jaswal and Neely (2006), it is likely that children 
will choose the reliable speaker in this context. However, it is possible that children will be more 
likely to accept information from an adult even if it is incorrect. Research on eyewitness 
testimony indicates that preschoolers are particularly susceptible to misinformation when it is 
provided by adults rather than by children (e.g., Ceci et al., 1987 and Lampinen and Smith, 
1995). 
 
To summarize, this study examined the effect of informant accuracy (reliable vs. unreliable 
attributions in a history phase), informant age (child vs. adult), and informant testimony type 
(positive or negative trait attribution in a test phase) on children’s willingness to accept 
informant testimony about a stranger. Both 3- and 4-year-olds and 5- to 7-year-olds engaged in a 
procedure adapted closely from Jaswal and Neely (2006). Participants watched a video in which 
two informants, one child and one adult (both females), labeled protagonists correctly or 
incorrectly as “mean” or “nice” depending on their behavior. This history phase established one 
informant as reliable and the other as unreliable. Next, participants engaged in a test phase where 
the same informants labeled female strangers, also one child and one adult, that participants had 
never seen as “mean” or “nice”. After hearing the informant attributions, participants were asked 
to make trait attributions about the strangers to determine the degree to which they endorsed the 
reliable speaker in the test phase and whether endorsement varied by trait valence. In addition to 
the main task, a separate control condition consisting of a new group of children was also 
included as a way of establishing the “baseline” positivity bias that children exhibit in trait 
attributions in this context. In this condition, participants simply made attributions about the 
strangers in the absence of informant testimony or any other information. 
 
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Jaswal and Neely, 2006 and Koenig and Harris, 2005), it 
was expected that children would be more likely to accept testimony from a reliable informant 
than from an unreliable informant in the test phase irrespective of whether the informant was an 
adult or a child. However, based on previous findings of a positivity bias in personality 
attribution, it was also expected that children would be more likely to accept positive trait 
attributions than negative trait attributions from reliable informants. 
 
Method 
Participants 
The final sample for the main task consisted of 109 participants: 48 3- and 4-year-olds (M = 49.2 
months, SD = 6.9, 22 boys and 26 girls) and 61 5- to 7-year-olds (M = 74.5 months, SD = 10.2, 
33 boys and 28 girls). Participants were tested in a laboratory or in preschools or schools in a 
mid-sized North American city. Participants were of mixed ethnic/racial identity: 64% 
Caucasian, 18% African American, 1.6% Latino/Hispanic, and 9.8% who classified themselves 
as mixed; an additional 6.5% chose not to report on this variable. The majority of families were 
from upper middle-class backgrounds. There were an additional 24 participants in a control 
condition: 12 3- and 4-year-olds (M = 50.1 months, SD = 5.6, 7 boys and 5 girls) and 12 5- to 7-
year-olds (M = 73.7 months, SD = 7.9, 3 boys and 9 girls). These participants were also of mixed 
ethnic/racial identity: 62.5% Caucasian, 12.5% African American, 4.2% Latino/Hispanic, 4.2% 
Asian, and 8.3% who classified themselves as mixed; an additional 8.3% chose not to report on 
this variable. 
 
Materials 
There were four phases in the study: video training, trait term training, a history training phase, 
and a test phase. Stuffed animal toys were used for video training, and toy characters were used 
for trait term training. In the history training phase, participants watched videos of actors 
engaged in positive or negative behaviors that were labeled by informants. In the test phase, 
there were video images of strangers that were labeled by the informants. 
 
Design and procedure 
Main task 
First, participants underwent brief video training to ensure that they could report taped verbal 
information accurately (see Zelazo & Boseovski, 2001). Next, there was a trait term training 
phase to ensure that participants could identify the trait labels “nice” and “mean” and 
corresponding behaviors that were associated with them. Notably, previous research indicates 
that young children readily make global trait attributions of niceness and meanness (e.g., 
Alvarez, Ruble, & Bolger, 2001). 
 
After the video and trait term training, participants completed a history training phase in which 
they viewed four video vignettes where a protagonist behaved in a clearly positive or negative 
way toward a recipient. Participants saw vignettes of a single valence (i.e., four positive vignettes 
or four negative vignettes). The decision to present behaviors of a single valence was based on 
pilot testing indicating that the younger children sometimes had difficulty in responding correctly 
when both valences were presented in the training phase. Vignettes were as follows: (a) a 
protagonist demolishing the sand castle of the recipient (negative version) or helping a recipient 
to build a sand castle (positive version); (b) a protagonist pushing a recipient intentionally so as 
to knock over his or her books (negative version) or helping to carry a recipient’s books (positive 
version); (c) a protagonist refusing to lend a jacket to a recipient (negative version) or lending a 
jacket to a recipient (positive version); (d) a protagonist taking a chocolate bar from a recipient 
(negative version) or sharing a chocolate bar with a recipient (positive version). These scenarios 
were chosen based on pilot testing indicating that they were understood by children in the study 
age group. 
 
Following each vignette, a new screen appeared and participants saw two informants: one child 
and one adult. The child was described as “a kid your age,” and the adult was described as “a 
grown-up just like your mom” (see Jaswal & Neely, 2006). Each informant labeled the 
protagonist as “nice” or “mean”. Half of the participants in each age group were assigned to an 
adult reliable informant condition (adult correct, child incorrect), and the remaining half were 
assigned to a child reliable informant condition (adult incorrect and child correct). Furthermore, 
for half of the participants the reliable informant made positive attributions, and for the 
remaining half the reliable informant made negative attributions. After the labeling, the video 
was paused and children were asked to identify which informant “said something wrong” to 
ensure correct interpretation of the event. Thus, the history training established that one 
protagonist made consistent accurate attributions and the other made consistent inaccurate 
attributions. Participants were required to obtain a minimum of three of four trials correct. Data 
from 26 participants (15 3- and 4-year-olds and 11 5- to 7-year-olds) were not included in the 
final sample due to failure to achieve the criterion. In the final sample, 86.2% of children were 
correct on all trials. 
 
After receiving the history trials that established which informant was reliable, participants 
received two test trials. In each test trial, participants did not witness any behaviors themselves. 
Instead, they saw a video still of a child or an adult woman who they had never seen before, and 
they viewed the same two informants label this protagonist as “nice” or “mean”. Participants 
were asked, “What kind of person is [protagonist]?” Children who did not respond spontaneously 
were given forced-choice options from which to choose: “nice”, “mean”, or “not nice or mean”.1 
Participants received one trial in which a protagonist was labeled as “mean” by the reliable 
informant and one trial in which the protagonist was labeled as “nice” by the reliable informant 
(with the unreliable informant using the other trait label). The order of the trials was 
counterbalanced across participants. The primary question of interest was whether children’s trait 
attributions in the test trials would be consistent with the attributions of the reliable speaker 
irrespective of testimony type (in which case children should endorse “nice” when the reliable 
speaker says “nice” and should endorse “mean” when the reliable speaker says “mean”) or 
whether children would be more likely to accept attributions of “nice” than of “mean”. 
 
Baseline control condition 
Children in the control condition were not given any history training or exposure to informants. 
Instead, they were shown the test images and asked the same test question as participants who 
received the main task. 
 
Results 
In addition to excluding data from participants who did not meet the history training criterion 
and from those who chose “not nice or mean” as a response, data from an additional four 
participants were excluded (two for failure to cooperate and two due to technical difficulties). 
 
Main task 
Endorsement of reliable speaker 
For each of the two test trials, participants were scored as correct for a response that was 
consistent with the reliable speaker (i.e., saying “nice” when the reliable speaker said “nice” and 
saying “mean” when the reliable speaker said “mean”) irrespective of whether they responded 
spontaneously or by forced choice. Thus, these reliability scores ranged from 0 to 2 points. 
Overall, participants were more likely than expected by chance to endorse the trait attribution 
made by the reliable speaker (M = 1.14, SE = 0.05), t(108) = 2.33, p = .02. To examine whether 
participants were more likely to choose the reliable speaker in the positive or negative valence 
trials, a test for correlated proportions was conducted (see Dixon & Massey, 1983). Results 
revealed that participants were significantly more likely to choose the reliable speaker when she 
said “nice” (75.2% of possible trials) than when she said “mean” (38.5% of possible trials), z = 
5.61, p < .0001. 
To examine effects of participant age, history training type, age of reliable speaker, and speaker 
order, a 2 (Age: 3- and 4-year-olds or 5- to 7-year-olds) × 2 (Reliability: child reliable or adult 
reliable) × 2 (History Training Type: positive or negative) × 2 (Speaker Order: child first or 
adult first) between-participants analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the number of 
responses that were consistent with the endorsement of the reliable speaker. There was a 
significant effect of history training type only, F(1, 93) = 4.08, p = .046, η2 = .17, and no other 
significant main effects or interactions.2 Participants who received history training consisting of 
positive behaviors were more likely to choose the reliable informant in the test phase 
(M = 1.28, SE = 0.08) than those who received history training consisting of negative behaviors 
(M = 1.00, SE = 0.08). 
Response patterns 
Responses were also categorized according to the four possible patterns across trials: reliable–
consistent (consistent with reliable speaker on both trials), positivity bias (response of “nice” 
on both trials), negativity bias (response of “mean” on both trials), and reversal (inconsistent 
with reliable speaker on both trials). The predominant response pattern was the positivity bias 
pattern (48.6% of participants), followed by the reliability (26.6%), reversal (12.8%), and 
negativity bias (11.9%) patterns. A McNemar χ2 test confirmed that the reliability of the 
speaker influenced attributions of “nice”, χ2(1, N = 109) = 5.72, p < .05. Participants were 
more likely to state “nice” when it was endorsed by the reliable speaker (75.2% of trials) than 
when it was endorsed by the nonreliable speaker (61.4% of trials). Effect size for this measure is 
taken as the difference in marginal proportions (i.e., .15). 
Finally, response patterns were examined further to determine whether they differed based on 
whether children received positive or negative history training. Findings revealed that these 
patterns were dependent on history training type, χ2(3, N = 109) = 16.3, p = .001 (see Table 
1A and Table 1B). For both training types, the majority of participants showed a positivity 
response pattern of endorsing the reliable speaker only when she said “nice” on the test trials 
but not when she said “mean” (i.e., in the latter case, they endorsed the unreliable speaker who 
said “nice”). The distribution of the remaining patterns differed based on training type. 
Among those who received positive training, the majority of children showed the reliability 
response pattern. For those who received negative training, the distribution of participants was 
similar across the three patterns. 
Table 1A. Percentages of trait attributions by consistency with the reliable speaker on the test 
trials for participants who received positive history training. 
 
Reliable–consistent for 
“nice” 
Reliable–inconsistent for 
“nice” 
Reliable–consistent for 
“mean” 
34.6 (reliability response 
pattern) 
1.9 (negativity response 
pattern) 
Reliable–inconsistent for 
“mean” 
57.6 (positivity response 
pattern) 
5.7 (reversal) 
Note: These response patterns are not dependent on one another. 
 
 
Table 1B. Percentages of trait attributions by consistency with the reliable speaker on the test 
trials for participants who received negative history training. 
 
Reliable–consistent for 
“nice” 
Reliable–inconsistent for 
“nice” 
Reliable–consistent for 
“mean” 
19.2 (reliability response 
pattern) 
21.0 (negativity response 
pattern) 
Reliable–inconsistent for 
“mean” 
40.3 (positivity response 
pattern) 
19.2 (reversal) 
Note: These response patterns are not dependent on one another. 
 
Baseline control condition 
Participants in the control condition were asked to make an attribution without any history 
training or informant testimony. An attribution of “nice” was made on 42 of the 48 trials 
(87.5%), which was significantly greater than expected by chance, t(23) = 8.30, p < .001. 
 
Discussion 
This study is the first to examine children’s use of informant testimony in the domain of social 
judgments, namely, personality attribution. The main question of interest was whether children 
would endorse trait testimony of a reliable informant over an unreliable informant and whether 
endorsement would be greater when the informant made positive trait attributions about strangers 
rather than negative ones. In general, the findings indicate that children’s use of reliable 
informant testimony extends to the social domain. A sizable minority of children endorsed the 
trait attributions of the reliable informant irrespective of whether she made a positive or negative 
trait attribution in the test trials. However, this willingness to accept testimony from the reliable 
speaker was dependent on the type of information provided. Of the four possible response 
patterns, the majority of participants exhibited a positivity bias pattern in which they endorsed 
the reliable speaker only when she made a trait attribution of “nice” and rejected the attribution 
of “mean” (i.e., chose the unreliable speaker who said “nice”). Notably, this positivity bias was 
moderated by reliability in that it was reduced when the informant was unreliable. Overall, an 
important contribution of this research is that it reveals that positive and negative testimony are 
not treated equally, at least in the context of social judgments. 
 
Consistent with previous research on acceptance of informant testimony by 3- to 5-year-olds 
(e.g., Jaswal et al., 2008, Nurmsoo and Robinson, 2009a and Nurmsoo and Robinson, 2009b), 
there were no significant age differences in response patterns. The majority of children in each 
age group exhibited the positivity bias pattern, and a substantial minority showed the reliability 
response pattern. Perhaps the simplistic nature of the task (e.g., global personality labels rather 
than sophisticated trait terms) reduced differences that might have emerged due to 
conceptualization and evaluation of the information itself. Moreover, efforts to train children to 
recognize the reliable speaker in the history training may explain why the positivity bias was not 
stronger in older participants as compared with younger participants, as has been the case in 
previous research on personality attribution (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). Also consistent with 
previous research (Jaswal & Neely, 2006), children’s response pattern did not differ based on 
informant age. Perhaps this context, in which the adult informant was described as “just like your 
mom” and the child informant was described as “a kid your age,” did not prompt children to see 
either person as the sole expert on personality (e.g., as compared with a situation in which 
children prefer peer input such as toy selection) (see VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). This is 
consistent with research indicating that children discuss the characteristics of others with both 
parents and peers (Astington, 1993). 
 
The finding that children are motivated to label others positively is consistent with previous 
results of a positivity bias in personality judgments (e.g., Lockhart et al., 2002 and Lockhart et 
al., 2008), and the current study extends this finding to situations in which children have no 
personal knowledge about an individual and must rely on others to learn about that individual. 
Children demonstrated an awareness of which informant was reliable, yet they proceeded to 
judge the stranger favorably much of the time. Jaswal and colleagues (2008) suggested that when 
children’s expectations conflict with the statements of an informant, they are less willing to 
accept informant testimony even if the informant is reliable. In their study, 3- to 5-year-olds were 
reluctant to accept irregular word forms that came from a speaker who was a reliable word 
labeler in the past. For example, participants endorsed information from a speaker who used 
regular plural and past tense forms even though the speaker had been unreliable at labeling 
words previously. This study identifies a new constraint in the use of informant testimony—the 
tendency to view or present others in a positive light. 
 
In interpreting these effects, it was useful to collect data from a control group of participants to 
determine children’s “baseline” positivity bias.3 Indeed, one possible interpretation of these 
results is that children disregarded informant testimony entirely and simply showed the positivity 
bias that is typically seen in personality judgments. There are several reasons why this is an 
unlikely explanation of the findings. First, a greater number of children made an attribution of 
“nice” in the control trials than in test trials where the unreliable informant endorsed “nice”, 
suggesting that the testimony of an unreliable informant dampened the positivity bias. Second, 
participants were significantly more likely to endorse “nice” when the reliable speaker endorsed 
“nice” than when the unreliable speaker did so, indicating that reliability status of the informant 
affected children’s judgments. Third, a sizable minority of participants chose the reliable 
speaker’s endorsement on both trials, suggesting that the methodology was appropriate (at least 
for some children) for establishing awareness of reliability cues. Fourth, participants underwent 
history training to ensure that they could correctly label positive and negative behaviors, and 
children who could not do so, including those who labeled mean behaviors as nice, were not 
included in the final sample. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that children’s 
performance in this study did not simply reflect inattention to the informant testimony. Instead, 
both a positivity bias and attention to informant reliability guided children’s behavior. 
 
In considering why participants exhibited a positivity bias in this context, there are several 
possibilities that could be explored in future research. Although children accepted the trait label 
of “mean” in the history training phase, they may have been reluctant to attribute a stable 
negative trait attribution to the stranger in the test phase based solely on informant testimony. 
Thus, one potential question for future research is whether children might accept testimony about 
behaviors more readily than traits in a test phase. At a general level, it is important to discover 
potential limits on the type of information that children will accept from others without firsthand 
observation. 
 
A second and potentially related issue concerns the assumptions that participants made about the 
nature of informants’ knowledge. In particular, participants were not told the basis of informants’ 
judgments in this study, and it is unclear whether they assumed that these judgments about the 
strangers were based on direct observations or other means. In the absence of specific 
information, participants may have reverted to the assumption that most people are nice. Given 
that children make mental state inferences about informants beyond noting that they are reliable 
or unreliable (see Nurmsoo and Robinson, 2009a and Nurmsoo and Robinson, 2009b), it is 
important to assess directly the role that these mental state inferences play in this context. Third, 
it is possible that children’s reluctance to make the attribution of meanness was influenced by 
display rules about appropriate behavior (i.e., not speaking badly about others). The training 
phase simply required children to recognize the view of the informants, whereas the test phase 
required them to make a judgment themselves. 
 
Another avenue for future research concerns the impact of history training type on subsequent 
treatment of informant testimony. Although the positivity bias was the most prevalent response 
pattern overall in this study, there were differences in patterns based on whether children 
received positive or negative history training. Children who received positive training were more 
likely than those who received negative training to choose the reliable informant in the test 
phase. This was unexpected given that the purpose of the training phase was simply to establish 
which informant was reliable. Although the reason for this result is unclear, it is possible that the 
positive information itself promoted better attention to the reliable informant, resulting in a 
heightened salience of the reliable speaker in the test phase. By contrast, a far greater percentage 
of children with negative history training than with positive history training showed a negativity 
bias. Thus, although history training was necessary to ensure that children could capitalize on 
informant reliability cues, it also appeared to “prime” children’s attention somewhat to positive 
or negative information that affected their subsequent endorsements in the test phase. The pattern 
of performance might have differed had children been exposed to both negative and positive 
behaviors during the history training phase or had they not been required to make explicit 
judgments in the training phase. 
 
In comparing these results with previous findings on selective social learning, it is important to 
consider domain differences in the nature of the information that is learned. Word learning 
adheres to principles of conventionality; within a language, we can agree generally on object 
labels. By contrast, in personality attribution, there are myriad sources of information from 
which to draw when judging a person (e.g., behavioral observation, frequency and severity of 
behaviors viewed, adherence to or violation of norms). Thus, these findings raise several 
questions about the use of informant testimony in the domain of personality attribution 
specifically. For example, future research could examine how much negative evidence children 
require from a reliable informant to override a positivity bias. It is also unknown how physical 
characteristics may affect children’s judgments, and this may be particularly relevant to 
personality attribution. Although participants did not differentiate their judgments about the 
strangers based on age in this study, this was not the central factor of interest. Future research 
needs to examine this factor, and other physical characteristics, systematically. For example, 
children may be more willing to attribute meanness to individuals who are unattractive or who 
exhibit negative facial expressions (e.g., anger). 
 
Finally, an individual differences approach to understanding children’s use of informant 
testimony may be a fruitful avenue for future research. For example, it is unclear to what extent 
there may be differences between children who endorse reliable informants and those who make 
positive or negative attributions about people indiscriminately. It is likely that there is an optimal 
range of functioning within which children are neither too trusting nor too skeptical of other 
people. Accordingly, examining the correlates of these response patterns in the future may 
enable the identification of children who are at risk for psychosocial maladjustment (e.g., 
compromised peer relations). 
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